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Abstract
There is an important information deficit on political and financial risks in Africa. This paper
fills this gap by compiling a unique database of financial (sovereign, banking, currency, 
expropriation) and political crises (regime changes, ethnic and revolutionary wars, genocides, 
armed conflicts) covering 53 African countries between 1965 and 2008. We employ a new 
methodological framework to disentangle cross-crisis from temporal contagion effects. This 
allows us to extend to Africa a number of insights from the literature on financial crises (e.g., 
the mutual contagion effects between banking and currency meltdowns). Importantly, and 
critically for a study devoted to Africa, political upheavals are of modest relevance to predict 
financial crises. These results may be reconciled with previous literature given our original 
focus on Africa and our event-based approach of financial and political risks.
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21. Introduction
Over the 1975-2010 period, emerging markets have become significant players in 
world trade and international capital flows. Developing countries’ share of world 
exports increased by 12 percentage points (from 25% to 37%), and their world share 
of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is on the rise.1 African countries, however,
have been left behind – Africa received only 2.7% of the world’s total average FDI 
over the period, and its share of world exports decreased by a staggering 2 percentage 
points, notwithstanding the fact that countries on the continent hold most of the 
world’s resources for at least ten minerals.2 International capital flows followed a 
similar path. Foreign lending to emerging markets took off in the 1970s through 
syndicated loans, followed shortly after by the issuance of bonds from which Africa 
was predominantly left out. Africa’s access to the international capital market is still 
extremely limited. In 2010, African external debt totaled US$ 324 billion, a mere 6% 
of the total for developing economies.3
Although investments in Africa have generated comparably high risk-adjusted returns 
on average, Africa has failed to attract significant investment flows. Warnholz (2008)
attributes this puzzle to an information deficit on African markets. Rating agencies’ 
coverage of the African continent has indeed been recent and focused on a limited 
number of countries. Private companies (e.g., Institutional Investors, or the European 
Intelligence Unit) and multilateral organizations (e.g., the World Bank and the 
OECD) assessing country risks in Africa have a more extensive coverage, but cluster 
rankings at the bottom of their scales, making it impossible to discriminate among 
countries. The paucity of hard information on the business environment in Africa and 
several decades of highly mediatized conflicts and political turmoil have certainly
weighed negatively on investors’ perception about the continent.
This paper helps fill this information deficit by compiling a unique database of 
political and financial crises in Africa. Our annual data span the political, currency, 
                                                            
1 Data on exports and foreign direct investments (FDIs) are from the United Nation Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), based on COMTRADE statistics.
2 Bauxite; cobalt; diamond; phosphate rocks; platinum groups metal; vermiculite; and zirconium.
3 These data are from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA): Economic 
Report on Africa 2011.
3expropriation, banking, and sovereign debt crises that struck the 53 countries of the 
African continent from 1965 to 2008.4 As of today, this is the most comprehensive
dataset on the subject, allowing us to draw new insights into the frequency of political 
and financial crises in Africa.
We bring three additional contributions to the previous literature on conflicts and 
crises. First, we design a general framework to analyze cross-crisis contagions, 
leading to parsimonious, robust, and economically-grounded crisis prediction models. 
We rely on model selection techniques (through Akaike and Bayesian Information 
Criteria, henceforth AIC/BIC) to select relevant prediction variables. For each type of 
crisis, we find the univariate prediction model that leads to the best fit and add other 
predictors one by one, only if this improves the information criterion, thus avoiding 
multicollinearity issues and overfitted, unstable prediction models. We address the 
issue of entangled temporal and cross-crisis contagions effects by performing 
separated estimations, hereby also minimizing the number of variables 
simultaneously introduced in the regression. We first analyze crisis hysteresis effects 
and derive a list of onsets of crisis for each country and crisis type. This leads us to 
predict onsets of financial and political crises from the occurrence of other types of 
crisis in the same country achieving a proper characterization of cross-crisis 
contagion effects and alleviating issues of auto-correlation in the specification.  
Second, our analysis extends to the African continent a number of insights drawn 
from the financial crisis literature. In particular, we confirm the mutually predictive 
nature of banking and currency crises (to which Kaminsky and Reinhardt 1999 refer 
logically as ‘twin crises’) and the predictive power of banking issues on onsets of 
sovereign defaults (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a and 2008b). We add the insight that 
sovereign, banking, and currency crises are in fact all mutually predictive in the case 
of Africa.
Our final contribution relates to the link between political and financial crises: 
Intriguingly, and critically for a study of financial crises in Africa, political upheavals 
                                                            
4 We exclude the Republic Arab Saharawi Democratic (or Western Sahara) from our list of African 
countries as the legal status of the country is still disputed, its sovereignty unresolved and data are 
barely available.
4have a relatively modest forecasting power on financial crises. Only one link is found 
significant at level 1%, the one running from regime changes to onsets of 
expropriation. But this effect has lost some relevance today as most expropriation 
events occurred in the 70s’. The other link, the one from armed conflicts to onsets of 
sovereign defaults, is only significant at level 5%.5 We also uncover a significant 
inverse relationship running from currency and sovereign crises to onsets of 
revolutionary wars.
The modest predictive power of political crises on financial events could come as a 
surprise, given the ample literature documenting the impact of political instability 
(reflected by e.g., the quality and stability of institutions and governments) on various 
indicators of financial risk (stock market volatility FDI flows, credit spread, 
investors’ or raters’ risk perception…) or long-term economic performance.6  
However, our results may be reconciled with previous literature given our original 
focus on Africa and our strict event-based approach of financial and political risks:
we restrict our scope to discrete outbreaks of political instability (regime changes, 
ethnic or revolutionary wars, genocides, armed conflicts) and financial turmoil
(expropriation, sovereign default, banking/currency meltdowns), which are very 
different in nature from the diffuse indicators of political instability, economic 
performance, or financial risk commonly encountered in the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background. The following section presents data, measurements and some descriptive 
statistics on crisis events. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy used for
defining the onsets of crises and analyzing crisis contagions. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results on cross-crisis spillover effects. Section 6 concludes.
                                                            
5 Note that the predictive power of political crises on financial crises is not retained under the most 
stringent BIC selection model (Section 4).
6 See Section 2 for a literature review.
52. Theoretical background
A large body of research examines the frequency and features of financial crises. This 
literature encompasses currency, banking and sovereign crises and focuses on the 
determinants of and interconnection between these crises. For decades, tracing world 
events, this literature has focused on emerging markets and less developed countries, 
but has paid little attention to Africa. 
Banking crises correspond to individual banks’ defaults, banks runs, and deposit 
freezes. These crises affect several types of foreign investors: Foreign banks or 
individuals that have financial claims on domestic banks in the forms of loans or 
bonds, entrepreneurs with local deposits (in foreign and/or domestic currency) in the 
context of foreign direct investment or foreign-based exporters facing payment 
disruption.7 Banking crises may also affect foreign investors through the credit 
channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) as individual banks are less willing to lend and 
entrepreneurs face steeper liquidity constraints during periods of banking turmoil.
Currency crises affect investors through the depreciation of repatriated profits, raising 
imported inflation and potential default on foreign currency denominated obligations.
A currency crisis is defined as an important depreciation of a currency together with
an increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the previous period.
Following the seminal work of Krugman (1979), several generations of models 
studied the determinants of currency (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; 
Obstfeld, 1994) and banking crises (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) and highlighted the 
link between currency, banking and sovereign instability (Krugman, 1999; Chang and 
Velasco, 1999).8 The recurrences of banking turmoil at times of currency crashes 
                                                            
7 Foreign banks could also own equities in local banks and be directly impacted by banking crises. In 
Argentina in 2001, the foreign shareholders (Chilean Inversora Norte-Sur and French Credit Agricole) 
of MBK Mercobank lost their entire investment. Indeed, both investors were asked by the Argentinean 
government to participate in a mandatory US$ 10 million capital increase in MBK Mercobank. Both 
parties refused to participate and walked away.
8 In Latin America of the 1980s and Mexico of the 90s, governments’ balance sheet currency 
mismatches forced sovereigns to default on their foreign obligations. During the Asian crisis, in the 
1990s, speculative currency runs led to banks’ defaults and to massive IMF rescue packages, thus 
underlining how dangerous intertwined currency and banking crises could be. In Argentina, , the entire 
6compelled their joint analysis under the label of ‘financial crises’ (Calvo 1998; 
Kaminsky, 1999; Kaminsky and Rheinhart, 1999; Sachs et al., 1996; Schneider and 
Tornell, 2004; Velasco, 1987). Countries experience a vicious circle whereby banking 
weaknesses lead to pressures on currencies and where currency depreciation renders 
banks insolvent. While the twin occurrences of banking and currency crises are now 
well established, the literature is inconclusive on the direction of causality (see 
Kaminsky and Rheinhart 1999).9
The Argentinean collapse of 2001/2002 revived the 1980s literature on sovereign 
defaults. Such defaults might be triggered by governments’ unwillingness to pay (see 
e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz 1981 and Eaton and Fernandez 1995 for a survey) or their 
inability to do so because of sudden loss of market access, unexpected external 
shocks or long-lasting fiscal profligacy (Roubini 2001). The consequences of the 
2007 subprime crisis for the banking system, and subsequently for Eurozone 
governments, illustrate the significant links between banking and sovereign risks. 
Reinhart (2002), analyzing crisis events in 62 countries, finds that in 85 percent of the 
cases, currency crises preceded sovereign defaults. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 
2008b, 2011), through the analysis of a comprehensive database, widely document 
the impacts of banking crises and financial crashes on sovereign defaults.
The financial crises literature also devotes some attention to the link between political 
and financial risk. The general intuition is that ‘political instability’ in a broad sense
may lead to sudden sovereign debt repudiations or drastic revisions in property rights, 
and therefore increase the level of uncertainty for investors, resulting in brutal capital 
reallocations. This intuition is supported by a vast literature documenting a positive 
association between ‘political instability’ (defined by the frequency of regime change, 
the length of tenure of policymakers, veto power and the like) and indicators of 
financial distress, such as capital flights (Lensink et al., 2000), sovereign debt 
default/rescheduling (Balkan, 1992), creditworthiness and the level/volatility of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
economy defaulted in 2001-2002, due to currency mismatching in the balance sheets of households, 
corporate entities, banks and sovereigns, after the pesos/dollar peg was removed.
9 The abundance of financial crises also triggered a rich body of literature on leading indicators of 
crises and early warning systems (Aziz et al., 2000; Berg and Patillo, 1999; Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998).
7sovereign credit spreads (Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987, Brewer and Rivoli, 1990, 
Kohlscheen, 2007, Cuadra and Sapriza, 2008).10
It should be noted, however, that none of the above studies specifically tackled the 
link between discrete political and financial events. The former type of events is
defined as crises entailing a high level of casualties such as armed conflicts, ethnic 
and revolutionary wars, genocides and regime changes. The latter category 
corresponds to sovereign default, expropriation and banking and currency meltdowns. 
In addition, to our knowledge, no study has so far investigated the particular case of 
the African continent.11
While the African continent is virtually absent from the financial crises literature, it is 
central to the conflicts and the comparative development literatures. Researchers 
focus on the conditions leading to conflicts and to the fall of nations (Rotberg, 2003), 
highlighting the importance of artificial borders (see Engllebert et al., 2002 and 
Alesina et al. 2011 for a counterargument), legal origins (Acemoglu et al., 2001), 
ethnic-fractionalization (Herbst 2000; Fearon, Laitin 2003; Michalopoulos, 
Papaioannou, 2011), and the dependence on natural resources (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005). Political scientists have long 
known that political institutions strongly influence development, and that political 
instability implies lower economic growth (Huntington, 1968, Moore, 1966). In the 
same vein, the comparative development literature posits that political uncertainty 
and bad institutions are detrimental to growth in African countries (Rodrik, 1999 and 
Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2003). In these papers, political instability is proxied by 
income inequality, ethnic fragmentation or the quality of institutions or governments 
(i.e., property rights, rule of law, government type).
                                                            
10 However, De Haan et al. (1997) find that political risk loses its forecasting power on the risk of debt 
rescheduling once economic variables are included. Le and Zak (2006) observe that the relation 
between capital flight and political instability is versatile : unconstitutional government change, 
internal uprisings, and the variance of policy implementation favor capital flights but collective 
protests, and major and minor constitutional government changes stimulate capital flight reversals.
11 Odedokun (1995) stands as a notable exception, analyzing the economic and financial determinants 
of debt rescheduling events on a sample composed of 39 African countries. As explained in this paper, 
‘those few studies that happen to cover African countries do so merely by including data for some of 
the countries in their multi-country data set so that their conclusions can hardly be said to be applicable 
to Africa.’
8We contribute to these different strands of literature by showing that, although 
‘diffuse’ political instability has been shown to undermine long-term growth
prospects, degrade investors’ sentiment and favor capital flights, ‘discrete’ political 
upheavals are only modestly helpful predictors of full-fledged sovereign defaults or
financial meltdowns. This insight is important as the seemingly ‘frequent’, poorly 
quantified and sensationalized political upheavals in Africa are likely to weigh 
negatively on investors’ perception through the well-known ‘dread’ and ‘unknown 
factors’ (see Slovic, 1987).
3. Data and First Evidence
3.1 Data
We study the incidence of crises by focusing on the 53 countries of the African 
continent over the 1965-2008 period. In order to investigate in particular the link
between political and financial events, we construct a unique database of the crises 
relevant to foreign investors, i.e., political, currency, expropriation, banking, and 
sovereign debt crises. 
As in Goldstone et al. (2010), most data on political crises come from the Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF).12 This database encompasses data on four distinct types 
of state failure—ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, adverse regime changes, and 
genocides and politicides—and covers the years 1965 to 2008. Crises are recorded as 
such if they involve a sudden, large number of deaths (except for adverse regime 
changes), thus abiding by our definition of discrete political events. We complete 
these data with armed conflict information taken from the UCDP/PRIO Conflict 
Dataset, as presented in Gleditsch et al. (2002).13 Political data are further described
                                                            
12 The PITF is hosted at George Mason University. The first refined version of the database appeared 
in Bates et al. (2003). Updates and enhancements were subsequently undertaken. More information can 
be found on the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) website: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf.
13 We use the UCDP/PRIO Conflict Dataset version 4-2008. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
is a joint project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International 
Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). Version 4-2008 is updated in accordance with the changes 
9in the Appendix.14 In the sequel, we refer to a political ‘upheaval’ or ‘crisis’ as a 
situation in which at least one of the state failure events listed above takes place 
during a given year. Political crises are listed in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
For expropriation, we rely on Tomz and Wright (2010) unique database, which covers 
the period 1929-2005.15 Tomz and Wright (2010) embraced Kobrin (1980, 1984)’s 
definition of expropriation (i.e., (a) a government taking ownership of a firm; (b) a 
government forcing foreigners to sell all or part of their investments; (c) a 
government taking control of foreign direct investment without becoming an owner; 
and (d) a government forcing investors to accept a substantial change in the terms of 
their contract). Table A1 in the Appendix presents their gathered data for African 
countries. 
For currency crises, we build on Frankel and Rose (1996), who define a currency 
crisis as a depreciation of a currency by at least 30%, with at least a 10% increase in 
the rate of depreciation compared to the previous period. We work on quarterly 
nominal exchange rate data provided by the IMF. Currency crises are computed 
quarterly, and any year including at least one currency crisis is reported as a year of 
crisis. Fixed exchange rate regimes are treated in a similar way. A fixed exchange rate 
country experiences a currency crisis if its nominal exchange rate suffers a 
devaluation of at least 30% during a given year. Table A1 in the Appendix reports 
currency crises for African countries for the period 1965-2008.
                                                                                                                                                                             
listed in Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen (2008).
14 Rotberg (2003) proposes criteria to differentiate weak, failed, and collapsed states. Weak states 
traditionally harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or intercommunal conflicts that have not yet become 
violent, while failed and collapsed states are marked by warring factions. Our definition of political 
upheaval is close to the criteria of failed and collapsed states, as all our above-defined states of failure 
(except occasionally adverse regime changes) involve violence and death.
15 Unfortunately, this database does not cover the last years of our time frame (i.e., 2006, 2007, and 
2008). As most expropriations occur at the beginning of the period (see section 3.2), these missing data 
should not modify our main results. The Tomz and Wright (2010) database includes only countries in 
which the U.S. invests. Consequently, we lack information on expropriation in Comoros and Sao Tome 
and Principle. The authors’ database also does not include creeping expropriations per se, namely the 
decision of a government to squeeze businesses through taxes, regulations, and the like. 
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In order to construct our banking crisis series, we compiled four existing databases: 
Caprio et al. (2005), Honohan and Laeven (2005), Reihnart and Rogoff (2008a), and 
Laeven and Valencia (2010).16 Episodes of banking crises can be classified as 
isolated events or systemic crises. In isolated events, one or a few banks show signs 
of stress, whereas, in systemic crises, the entire banking system is shaken. Any bank 
distress, whether systemic or not, may result in potential losses. Our comprehensive 
database thus includes both systemic and isolated episodes. In the case of 
discrepancies across databases or a lack of end dates for banking crises, we refer to 
the timing of the crisis as it appears in IMF annual country reports (Article IV). Table 
A2 in the Appendix lists our banking crisis episodes. Our database covers the 1975-
2008 period.
A sovereign crisis corresponds to a government’s incapacity or near-incapacity to 
realize payments on principal or interest falling due on its debt. We propose a unique
database of sovereign crises which encompasses sovereign defaults on both loans and 
bonds and which accounts for near-default episodes.17 For defaults on sovereign 
bonds issued in local and foreign currency, we rely on Standard and Poor’s (2006), 
which we complement using Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b). Countries’ defaults on 
loans are more difficult to capture because of limited information. We record loan 
default episodes from the Paris Club and near-default episodes from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as sovereign defaults on loans. The Paris Club is in charge of 
renegotiating bi-lateral loans.18 We scrutinize its debt renegotiation episodes and 
exclude renegotiations occurring in the framework of the debt reduction of highly 
indebted countries (HIPC) which do not reflect sovereign defaults. Countries under 
the HIPC program benefit from a three-stage debt renegotiation, the last one known 
                                                            
16 These papers define a banking crisis as a banking sector difficulties (e.g., drops in share prices, loss 
of asset values following bubbles bursting, or bank runs) leading to closures, mergers, takeovers by the 
public sector, or large-scale liquidity support provided by central banks.As noted by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008b), banking crises are defined through events and not through data. Indeed, the price of 
bank stocks cannot be used in a cross-country study, as most banks in the developing world are not 
publicly traded.
17 Note that numerous indicators (such as debt over GDP, central banks foreign assets, etc.) could be 
used to define a sovereign crisis. We rely on an event-based definition, which is more appropriate in 
our context.
18 The London Club handles renegotiations between countries and private banks holding their loans. 
Unfortunately, London Club data are not publicly available and could not be included in our database.
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as the “Cologne term” allowing for up to 90% debt cancellation. We infer that all 
renegotiation episodes other than HIPC correspond to post-sovereign defaults.19
We also include near-default episodes as defined by Manasse and Roubini (2009).
Near-default episodes are crisis episodes during which an IMF Standby or Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) programs prevent a full-fledged government default—the crisis 
did happen but did not actually lead to sovereign default.20 We only include Standby 
and Extended Fund Facility program data with amounts higher than the country’s 
IMF quota.21 As for the Paris Club HIPIC program, IMF’s poverty alleviation 
programs (i.e., the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the former famous 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Program (PRGF), recently replaced by the 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF)) are excluded from our database. Our definition of a 
sovereign crisis is particularly extensive. By including Paris Club renegotiations,
regardless of the amount of debt rescheduling, we account for far more crises than the 
previous literature on the subject. For example, we uncover four crises in Algeria,
against one in Manasse and Roubini (2009) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), or nine 
crises in Nigeria, against five in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b). All our additional 
crisis events correspond to Paris Club renegotiations. Table A3 in the Appendix 
reports our sovereign crisis episodes over the 1965-2008 period.
                                                            
19 The date of renegotiation may not perfectly match the timing of the crisis. The crisis event (i.e., 
incapacity to provide debt payments) may occur in the year prior to the Paris Club renegotiation. We 
carefully compared the Paris Club dates with reported crisis dates from other sources when they exist. 
We did not find any consistency in the Paris Club dates’ bias. In many cases, dates coincide. We thus 
decided to keep renegotiation dates as proxies for sovereign crises. 
20 As argued by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), referring to Thailand and Korea in the late 1990s, 
countries that avoid sovereign default through massive loans from the IMF usually suffer 
traumas similar to those of defaulting countries.
21 The Standby program is an IMF lending facility established in 1952 through which a member 
country can use IMF financing up to a specified amount to overcome short-term or cyclical balance of
payments difficulties. Instalment releases are conditional upon members meeting performance criteria, 
such as monetary and budgetary targets. The EFF program is an IMF lending facility established in 
1974 to assist member countries in overcoming balance of payments problems which stem largely 
from structural problems and require a longer period of adjustment than is possible under a Stand-By 
Arrangement. 
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3.2 African Crises: First Evidences
In this section we provide evidence on the number and frequency of crises in the 
African continent (per year and country). Table 1 presents the number of crises by 
type and country, while Table 2 provides an overview of crises’ frequency. 
Unsurprisingly, the average number of political upheavals is high and varies greatly 
across countries. An average country experiences more than 11 years of political 
turmoil between 1965 and 2008, with a maximum (resp. minimum) of 43 (resp. 0) 
crisis years over the period. The GDP-weighted mean presents an even larger 
coefficient, suggesting that bigger countries are more crisis-prone. Such findings may 
reflect the higher instability of resource-rich countries evidenced in the natural 
resource curse literature. Gylfason (2011) finds that, in most African countries, 80% 
of tangible capital is related to natural resources, while Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 
2005) argue that natural resources may provide a motive for armed rebellions and 
find a statistical association between the importance of natural resources and the 
probability of internal conflicts. For example, civil wars in Angola and Zaire (Congo) 
have been associated with natural resources, and the oil-rich Nigeria has suffered a 
civil war (the Nigeria-Biafra ‘67-70 war) and numerous military coups since its 
independence. 
Banking and sovereign crises occurred quite frequently, with an average of 
respectively 5.2 and 4.8 years per country over the period. Once again, the situation is 
very different across countries, with a maximum of 17 years (resp. 23 years) of 
banking crises (resp. sovereign crises). For these two types of event, country size does 
not seem to matter much. Finally, expropriations are scarce (about two crisis events
on average), and with an average of 2.4 years of crisis, African countries also 
experienced a limited number of currency dips.
13
Table 1. Number of Crises by Country (1965-2008)
Country Expropriation
Currency 
crisis
Political 
crisis
Banking 
crisis*
Sovereign 
crisis
Algeria 9 2 18 5 4
Angola 1 5 40 6 3
Benin 2 1 2 5 4
Botswana 0 0 0 2 0
Burkina Faso 0 1 3 7 3
Burundi 0 2 29 5 1
Cameroon 1 1 2 11 4
Cape Verde 0 0 0 1 0
Central African Rep. 2 1 7 17 7
Chad 2 1 40 12 3
Comoros 0 1 6 0 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 8 6 22 14 10
Congo, Rep. of 5 1 6 11 5
Djibouti 0 0 6 5 2
Egypt 3 4 12 8 3
Equatorial Guinea 0 3 11 3 4
Eritrea 0 2 6 1 0
Ethiopia 2 1 43 2 3
Gabon 2 1 0 1 12
Gambia 2 1 2 8 1
Ghana 5 4 4 9 4
Guinea 3 2 2 3 4
Guinea-Bissau 0 4 12 4 3
Ivory Coast 1 1 7 4 15
Kenya 3 1 7 10 3
Lesotho 1 2 3 1 0
Liberia 2 1 14 5 23
Libya 6 1 1 0 0
Madagascar 5 4 1 1 10
Malawi 3 3 0 0 3
Mali 0 1 9 5 4
Mauritania 2 1 5 10 6
Mauritius 0 0 0 1 0
Morocco 5 3 17 9 7
Mozambique 5 3 27 9 7
Namibia 2 2 0 0 0
Niger 6 1 8 14 8
Nigeria 0 4 17 6 18
Rwanda 0 4 15 1 2
Sao Tome and Principe 0 4 0 14 1
Senegal 1 1 12 4 11
Seychelles 0 1 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 1 8 14 7 9
Somalia 1 7 30 0 2
South Africa 0 2 31 3 3
Sudan 3 4 35 0 5
Swaziland 1 2 1 5 0
Tanzania 5 3 1 11 5
Togo 1 1 1 3 3
Tunisia 0 0 1 5 7
Uganda 4 6 42 3 7
Zambia 8 7 6 4 7
Zimbabwe 1 9 17 5 9
* The banking crises database covers the 1975-2008 period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics – 53 African countries 1965-2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mean 
(weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expropriation 2332 2.15 2.37 0 9 2.90
Political Crisis 2332 11.23 12.55 0 43 19.56
Currency Crisis 2332 2.41 2.18 0 9 2.66
Banking Crisis 1802 5.21 4.34 0 17 5.31
Sovereign Crisis 2332 4.81 4.73 0 23 4.82
Note: Column (2) provides the average number of crises per country across different years, whereas column (6) 
exhibits the GDP-weighted average, where weights are defined as the period-average share of a country’s GDP 
in African GDP. Banking crises cover the 1975-2008 period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figures 1 displays the number of countries in crisis in a given year. A country is said 
to be in crisis a given year if it is hurt by at least one of the five types of crisis listed 
above (i.e., political, expropriation, currency, banking or sovereign). Strikingly, in the 
1980s and 1990s, the share of countries in situation of crisis reaches 80%. In the last 
decade, the share of countries in crisis attained a low of 20%. 
Figure 2 reports the observed number of crises by type over the sample period. The 
1980s-1990s' peak in crisis observed in Figure 1 is mainly due to a surge in banking 
and sovereign problems. Most banking crises occurred in the late ‘80s and the ‘90s. 
This corresponds to a period of liberalization and deregulation across the board, 
which entailed a rise in banking crises in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 1999). Sovereign crises are particularly important in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) highlight the importance of dropping 
commodities prices and reduced capital inflows as explanatory variables for the surge 
in sovereign defaults in this period in Africa and other emerging markets. A large 
share of countries endured multiple banking and sovereign crises over the period 
(e.g., 13% of African countries faced 11 to 15 years of banking crises and 23% 
endured 6 to 10 years of sovereign crises).22
                                                            
22 Table A4 in the Appendix provides information on the share of countries experiencing a crisis by 
number of occurrences. For example,58% of African countries faced between one and five years of 
expropriation over the period, while very few countries experienced 6 to 10 years of expropriation and 
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Figure 1: Share of countries facing a crisis (in %)
       Source: Authors' calculations
Figure 2: Number of crises by type 
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As depicted in Figure 2, a peak of currency issues hit Africa in 1994 as the CFA franc 
was devalued against the French franc, thus affecting almost one-third of African 
                                                                                                                                                                             
none more than 10 years. Concerning sovereign crises, 49% of the countries had between one and five
years of crisis, 23% faced between 6 and 10 years of sovereign crisis, and 6% experienced 11 to 15 
years of sovereign crisis. Note that years may be subsequent or not.
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countries. Between 1965 and 2008, most African nations (i.e., 90%) actually faced at 
least one currency crisis. These crises are however relatively infrequent, with few 
countries facing more than five crises over the period. Expropriations cluster in the 
1970s, with almost no occurrences since the 1980s, as expropriation have 
progressively disappeared as an instrument for Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
policy (Minor, 1994). Figure 2 reveals a pattern where sovereign crises stand as a 
substitute for expropriation. As argued by Tomz and Wright (2010), the possibility to 
renegotiate debt and/or borrow from the IMF may have reduced the need for revenue 
through expropriations. Although 68% of the countries went through some 
expropriation events, most countries (87% of them) experienced less than five years 
of crisis from 1965 to 2008. Expropriation crises thus appear relatively scarce and 
outdated.
Finally, the number of political upheavals is quite stable over the period, fluctuating 
between 10 and 20 occurrences per year.23 This latter number corresponds to 
situations where more than a third of the African continent is torn by political turmoil. 
There is a large pool of countries with almost uninterrupted political crises. Although 
about 26% of our sample countries experienced less than five years of political 
upheaval, 19% of the countries have gone through more than 20 years of political 
crises (see Table A4 in the Appendix).
In sum, expropriation and currency crises do not seem particularly severe in Africa. 
Sovereign and banking crises used to be frequent but have receded since the 
beginning of the 21st century. The prevalence of political upheavals is however a 
genuine specificity of the continent which probably weighs on investors’ risk 
perceptions due to the stigma attached to these highly mediatized events and the 
important weight granted to political factors in widespread credit ratings and ‘country 
risk’ evaluation models. Investigating the forecasting power of political upheavals on 
‘financial insecurity’ in all its dimensions (i.e., expropriation events and banking, 
                                                            
23 Armed conflicts and ethnic wars are the most frequently observed types of political upheavals with 
respectively 8 and 4 average occurrences per country over the 1965-2008 period. Then come
revolutionary wars (3 average occurrences per country), and finally regimes changes and genocides (2 
average occurrences per country).  
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currency, or sovereign crises) is thus of particular relevance for Africa. The next 
sections will provide more insights into these cross-crisis contagion effects.
4. Empirical strategy
Our empirical methodology is set out below. We direct our effort toward avoiding 
multicollinearity and overfitting issues in a framework where potential predictors are 
numerous and strongly correlated. This is achieved through the use of a ‘forward step 
AIC/BIC procedure’, which consists in adding predictors one by one, as long as this 
leads to a decrease in the selected information criterion. In addition, our study of the 
cross-crisis contagions faces the problem of entangled cross-crisis and temporal 
contagion effects. For example, if banking crises are statistically associated to
currency crises, we cannot know for sure that a proper contagion effect from currency 
to banking crises is involved since this effect may be due to lingering banking crises 
causing currency crises at some stage.24 On way to solve this issue is to control for 
past banking crisis occurrences when trying to explain banking crises by currency 
crises. However, in order to reduce the number of predictors to be simultaneously
introduced in the regressions, we separately addressed the problems of temporal and 
cross-crisis contagions. In a first step, we derive, from the analysis of crisis hysteresis 
effects, the list of onsets of crisis for each country and each type of crisis. In a second 
stage, we try to predict onsets of crisis from the occurrence of other types of crisis in 
the same country. By predicting onsets of crisis instead of outright crisis events, we 
get rid of the problem of serial correlation and are able to identify contagion effects
between related types of crisis. To come back to our illustrating example, if the 
occurrence of a currency crisis predicts a higher conditional probability of observing 
an onset of banking crisis the same or following year, we will consider that an effect 
of ‘contagion’ is identified from currency to banking crises.
                                                            
24 Assume, for instance, that a banking crisis, lasting from year t to t + 4, degenerates into a currency 
crisis at year t + 1. In this case, there is contagion from banking to currency crisis at t + 1. The 
subsequent occurrence of a banking crisis at t + 2 should not lead us to infer however that a contagion 
effect from currency to banking crisis occurred at t + 2. 
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4.1 Onsets of crises: Analysis of time-clustering effects
In order to define the onset of a crisis as the ‘first event dissociated from previous 
crisis clusters in a given country’, we analyze the way past crisis occurrences predict 
future crises of the same type in the same country.
4.1.1 Methodology
For a given specification, the conditional probability of observing a crisis in country i
at year t is derived from a logit model of the following type:
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where itp is the probability of observing a crisis in country i at year t, i is a country-
dependent fixed effect, and the variables jtX 1 (j=1,2,…,N) are the crisis predictors, 
which in our setting correspond to past crisis events of the same type. 25
The associated log-likelihood is: 
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where itY is the binary variable that equals 1 if there is a crisis in country i at time t 
and 0 otherwise.
The investigation of crisis determinants faces two important issues. First, as model 
variables are strongly correlated, statistical inference may be fraught with 
multicollinearity issues. Second, there is a risk of overfitting the model to past data, if 
too many crisis predictors are simultaneously introduced in the regression. Overfitting 
leads to unrobust prediction models that are highly sensitive to the inclusion of new 
                                                            
25 We estimate conditional, instead of outright, logit models to avoid well-known bias due to incidental 
parameters problems associated with the introduction of fixed-effects in non-linear probability 
models.
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data and which generally perform badly out-of-sample. As recommended by Granger 
et al. (1995), we thus carry out a model selection approach through the minimization 
of two different information criteria. 
We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) which attempt to strike a tradeoff between model goodness-of-fit and 
model robustness (how sensitive the model is to an error or an addition in the crisis 
data). These are computed as weighted averages of the model log-likelihood and the 
number of model parameters. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) are defined as:
 
)1)(log(2
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where T is the number of country-years in the sample.26
Given that the set of possible models increases exponentially with the total number of 
potential predictors, we opt for a sequential model search process that includes 
predictors one by one. More precisely, the “forward step AIC/BIC” methodology
starts with the univariate model that carries the highest information and sequentially 
adds explanatory variables, retaining them if they lead to an increase in the model’s 
quality (i.e., a decrease in the information criterion).27 The retained threshold for 
statistical significance is 5%.28
We introduce two types of explanatory variables to characterize temporal contagion 
effects: Rolling windows crisis frequencies and distance to last crisis. The former are 
continuous variables representing the frequency of crises of the same type in the same 
                                                            
26 The Bayesian Information Criterion gives more weight to the robustness issue than the Akaike 
Information Criterion.
27 Variables are added as long as the improvement in the quality of the fit is sufficient to make up for 
the loss in robustness due to additional model complexity.
28 We also tested the "backward step AIC/BIC" method. This method consists in estimating the full 
model and sequentially removing an explanatory variable if this removal leads to a decrease in the 
information criterion. Our results are robust to this alternative methodology.
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country within a rolling window of n years. Hence, this variable characterizes the 
“nearby” density of crises over the recent past. The second group of variables
characterizes the distance to last crisis. These variables carry information on the time 
elapsed since the occurrence of the last crisis of the same type in the same country. 
We denote )(nX the dummy variable equal to 1, if a crisis occurred n years or less 
before the evaluation date and 0 otherwise. We simultaneously introduce the variables 
)(nX for n=1,2,…,10 in order to capture memory patterns where the conditional 
probability of observing a crisis gradually decreases non linearly with the time 
elapsed since the last crisis.
Figure 3
Memory pattern
Figure 3 is an example of a memory pattern where the probability of observing a 
crisis is a linear combination of the variables )4()2( , XX and )5(X . The risk is 
maximal (probability of 40%) when the previous crisis occurred one or two years 
before. It decreases to 0.3 if the previous crisis occurred three or four years before, 
and declines further to 0.2 if the previous crisis happened exactly five years before. 
After six years, the risk remains at a low 5% and no longer depends on the distance to 
last crisis occurrence. 
4.1.2 Defining onsets of crises
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Table 3 and 4 report the results of conditional logit estimations on our BIC-selected 
models for temporal contagions.29 In these tables, we only report variables that have 
been selected through the BIC forward selection method (all others have been ruled 
out of the model based on this criterion). 
Hysteresis effects are very strong for banking and political crises events, for which 
the conditional crisis likelihood markedly increases with the occurrence of a crisis the 
preceding year. These results reflect the temporal contagion effects present in banking 
crises: A run on a large bank usually triggers chain reactions across interconnected 
banking systems. The one-year hysteresis affects all types of political upheavals. 
Uprisings, armed conflicts or ethnical wars indeed unleash sequences of retaliations, 
repressions and/or counter-revolutions, which causes a protracted climate of tension 
before the situation settles down.
Regarding expropriation, currency, and sovereign crises, there is once again evidence 
of temporal clustering effects, but the lagged occurrence the preceding year is now 
irrelevant. Expropriation events have the longest memory, with past events predicting 
future occurrences up to six years ahead. Sovereign crises present an interesting 
memory pattern, as the conditional probability of observing a crisis only depends on 
occurrence in any of the past four years. In the years immediately following a debt 
renegotiation, countries traditionally try to remain current on their obligations. Post-
default countries may also see their access to international financing reduced due to a 
loss of reputation (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) or to the legal nature of debt contracts 
(Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). These patterns help explain the absence of short memory 
in sovereign crises. 
                                                            
29 The number of observations differs markedly across regressions. This is because banking crises are 
recorded only from 1975 onwards and because the ‘distance to last crisis’ variable becomes known 
only after at least 10 years have elapsed without crisis or after one crisis has occurred (the date of first 
crisis being different for each country and crisis type).
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Table 3: Temporal crisis contagions (financial crises)
53 African countries from 1965 to 2008
Currency Banking Sovereign Expropriation
Distance to last crisis
less than one year 2.44
0.17***
less than two years 0.88
0.27***
less than three years 1.11
0.19***
less than four years 1.12
0.15***
less than six years 1.93
0.36***
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.12 0.076 0.17
Obs. 1878 1348 1863 1939
Countries 53 53 53 53
Period 1966-2008 1977-2008 1966-2008 1967-2008
Notes: Estimation of the temporal contagion logit model with predictive variables relating to past crisis occurrences. 
The variable “less than n years” equals 1 if a crisis occurred n years or less before the date under consideration. All 
variables that do not appear in Table 3 have been ruled out of the model based on the BIC forward selection method. 
Standard errors are reported below the estimated logit model coefficients. *** indicates significance at the level of 
1%.
Table 4: Temporal crisis contagions (political crises)
53 African countries from 1965 to 2008
Reg chg Genocide Ethnic war Rev war Armed conflict Any political crisis
Distance to last crisis
less than one year 2.59 2.86 2.71 2.96 1.40 1.64
0.23*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.18***
Rolling frequency
five years 0.61 0.52
0.25** 0.22**
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.27 0.078 0.11
Obs. 1895 1844 1918 1864 1913 1948
Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53
Period 1966-2008 1966-2008 1966-2008 1966-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008
Notes: Estimation of the temporal contagion logit model with predictive variables relating to past crisis occurrences. The 
variable “less than n years” equals 1 if a crisis occurred n years or less before the date under consideration. All variables that 
do not appear in Table 4 have been ruled out of the model based on the BIC forward selection method. Standard errors are 
reported below the estimated logit model coefficients. ***, ** indicate significance at the level of 1 and 5% respectively.
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4.2 Analysis of cross-crisis contagion
Our aim is to analyze contagion effects across crisis types, investigating in particular 
whether African crises comply with the well-known contagion mechanisms 
evidenced in the literature between currency, sovereign, and banking crises. As 
political upheavals are a salient feature of the African continent, we also explore the 
cross-predictive power of political and financial crises. 
For this purpose, we examine the way in which onsets of crisis in a given country 
may be predicted from crises of other types in the same country. A crisis event is 
assumed ‘independent of past crisis realizations’ if it occurs at least n years apart 
from the previous crisis event of the same nature in the same country. Here, n is a 
crisis-dependent time lag related to the memory time of each type of crisis as 
estimated in Section 4.1. It corresponds to the number of years after which the 
conditional probability of observing a crisis becomes independent of the time elapsed 
since the last crisis (n is one for banking crises, five for political upheavals, three for 
currency crises, four for sovereign crises, and six for expropriation events).  
Having properly defined onsets of crisis, we estimate the following logit model:
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where itp is the probability of observing a crisis in country i at time t, conditional on 
observing no crises of the same type in the n years preceding the evaluation date.
Our purpose is to provide grounded information on the predictive power of crises on 
other types of crises, which limit concerns related to potential endogeneity issues 
caused by omitted variables (e.g., observing a banking crisis may infer a higher 
probability of a sovereign crisis, although we do not assess whether the banking crisis 
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actually caused the sovereign one). In order to capture infra-year contagion effects, 
this within-country contagion model includes both lagged and contemporaneous 
crises as predictive variables. The explanatory variables jtX 1 and jtX are therefore 
binary variables representing occurrences of other crisis types in the same country at 
times (t -1) and t respectively.
The list of predictors used is: currency, banking and sovereign crises, expropriations, 
regime changes, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, armed conflicts and genocides (at 
years t and t -1). We do not include country-fixed effects in this setting because of the 
limited number of crisis occurrences (only zero to two onsets of specific financial 
crises per country on average over the 1965-2008 period), which impedes drawing
reliable inferences on country effects. As n and the number of onsets of crisis differ 
across crisis types, the number of observations differs accordingly. We have 
alternatively used the AIC and BIC criteria in the current analysis to establish a 
distinction between ‘first-order contagion effects’ (those passing the more stringent 
BIC criterion) from ‘second-order contagion effects’, passing the AIC criterion only.
In the following tables, numbers in bold refer to variables that were selected by the 
BIC criterion. 
5. Results
Our results for onsets of financial crises (i.e., cross-crisis contagion) are reported in 
Table 5. Our findings confirm the ‘twin’ nature of banking and currency crises
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Everything else equal, the probability of an onset of 
banking crisis is multiplied by four if the country faced a currency crisis the 
preceding year.30 The transmission mechanisms are well known: currency crises may 
lead to a depositors’ bank run and to the deterioration of banks’ loan portfolios. 
Conversely, banking crises may initiate currency runs, as observed in Thailand during 
the 1997 Asian crisis. This is confirmed in our African dataset since banking crises 
predict onsets of currency crises at level 5%. Observing a banking crisis multiplies by 
                                                            
30 The unconditional probability of observing an onset of banking crisis is 4.1%.
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2.1 the probability of onset of currency crisis the subsequent year (the unconditional 
probability being 4.3%). Interestingly, the impact of past currency events on onsets of 
banking crises appears more significant (statistically and economically) than the other 
way round. This suggests that contagions are even more powerful when they evolve 
from currency to banks.
We also find the expected strong association between banking and sovereign crises, 
particularly from banking problems to onsets of sovereign defaults (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2008a, 2008b and 2011). The conditional probability of an onset of sovereign 
crisis is as high as 19.7% if a banking crisis occurred the same year, up from 5.6% for 
the unconditional probability. Governments indeed have a tendency to rescue ailing
banks due to the systemic nature of banking crises. In so doing, they undermine their 
financial profile through money creation or additional debt. Moreover, credit 
crunches are associated to a contraction of economic activity, further impairing
government budgets. Conversely, sovereign defaults generally affect the banking 
system through the depreciation of bank-held sovereign debt and the erosion of the 
state guarantee accruing to local banks. The probability of a banking crisis 
conditional on a sovereign crisis the same year jumps to 8.2%, from an unconditional 
probability of 4.1%. 
Currency and sovereign crises mutually predict each other at the infra-year level. 
Indeed, sharp currency devaluations often entail solvency problems for sovereigns (if 
sovereign debt was issued in a foreign currency), while sovereign crises may lead to 
debt monetization and currency debasement. There is evidence of both effects in our 
sample of African countries, with a statistical significance of 1%. The probability of 
an onset of currency crisis (resp. sovereign crisis) conditional on sovereign crisis 
(resp. currency crisis) is 11.2% (resp. 20.7%), up from an unconditional probability of 
4.3% (resp. 5.6%). Therefore, banking, currency and sovereign crises are ‘triplet 
crises’ -- any type of crisis among the group predicts and is predicted by the two other 
types of crisis. Contagions involving sovereign crises are always observed at the 
infra-year level: Whereas onsets of banking (resp. currency) crises are predicted with 
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a lag, onsets of sovereign defaults are often concomitant with outbreaks of banking or 
currency meltdowns. 
Table 5: Cross-crisis contagions (onsets of financial crises)
53 African countries from 1965 to 2008 31
Currency  Banking Sovereign Expropriation
Currency t-1 1.42 1.16
0.35*** 0.57**
Currency t 1.31
0.36***
Banking t-1 0.72
0.30**
Banking t 1.26
0.31***
Sovereign t 0.97 0.68
0.29*** 0.33**
Political t-1 0.56 1.55
0.29** 0.57***
armed conflict reg change 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.036 0.068 0.040
Obs. 1475 1473 1142 1664
Countries 53 53 53 53
Period 1978-2008 1976-2008 1979-2008 1971-2008
Notes: Estimation of the cross-crisis within-country contagion logit model using as a dependent variable the 
onsets of financial crisis and as predictive variables the occurrences of different types of crisis the preceding or 
same year in the same country. All variables that do not appear in Table 5 have been ruled out of the model 
based on the forward step AIC selection method. Numbers in bold face indicate that the variable was also 
selected by the more stringent BIC criterion. Standard errors are reported below the logit model coefficients. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the level of 1 and 5% respectively.
Finally, currency crises, which go hand by hand with depleting foreign reserves, may 
give rise to expropriations. This is reflected in the predictive power of currency crises 
on onsets of expropriation. The conditional probability of an onset of expropriation is 
                                                            
31 This table only reports the explanatory variables selected through the AIC/BIC information criterion 
methodology. This explains the low number, and high significance, of dependent variables in the table.
27
4.1% if there is a currency crisis the preceding year, with an unconditional probability 
standing at 1.3%.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the relation between political and financial events. 
The impact of political turmoil on financial risk is often explained in the literature by 
the fact that wars, or ‘coups’, may lead to sudden sovereign debt repudiations and 
drastic revisions in property rights, thereby increasing the level of stress and 
uncertainty for investors and possibly giving rise to brutal capital flights and banking 
or currency problems. The contagions unfolding from financial to political turmoil are 
explained, for their part, by the fact that financial crises create an environment of 
exacerbated anxiety and chaos that may crystallize the anger of the population, hence 
providing a fertile ground for riots, ethnic and social conflicts, or assaults of 
politically organized groups on the authority of the incumbent government.  
Two of our results support the existence of contagions from the political to financial 
spheres (Table 5). First, the contagion observed from regime changes to expropriation 
may suggest that the ‘necessity’ or desire to expropriate foreign investors serves as a 
motive to overthrow an incumbent government perceived as too favorable to foreign 
interests in periods of crisis. It may also reveal that new regimes feel relieved from 
the obligations towards foreign companies supported by their predecessors. This 
finding has however lost some of its relevance today since, as pointed out in Section 
3, expropriation is less and less used as policy instruments in the LDC.32  The second 
result that supports a link from political to financial risk is the predictive power of 
armed conflicts on onsets of sovereign defaults (significant at 5% level). The 
unconditional probability of an onset of sovereign default is 5.6% while this 
probability conditional on an armed conflict the previous year rises to about 10%.
Note however that these results on the predictive power of political crises on financial 
crises do not pass the most stringent BIC model (only selected by the AIC model).
                                                            
32 The probability of an onset of expropriation conditional on observing a regime change the previous 
year is about 6.1%, up from an unconditional probability of around 1.3%. But the estimations is based 
mostly on events that occurred in the 70s’ (e.g., Ethiopia in 1975 and Swaziland in 1974). 
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The analysis of political events, presented in Table 6, reveals interesting patterns as 
regards the links across political events themselves. Outbreaks of revolutionary wars 
and adverse regime changes are associated from their very definition (see Appendix). 
Ethnic wars logically erupt together with genocides, as do armed conflicts with ethnic 
wars and with revolutionary wars. The fact that infra-year contagion effects are 
systematically at play is noteworthy: Onsets of political crises are often concomitant. 
Table 6: Cross-crisis contagion (onsets of political crises)
53 African countries from 1965 to 2008
Reg change Genocide Ethnic war Rev war Armed conflict
Reg chg t 1.38
0.62**
Genocide t 3.36
0.52***
Ethnic war t 1.06 3.92 2.6
0.37*** 0.78*** 0.54***
Rev war t 1.32 4.34
0.40*** 0.65***
Armed conflict t 2.63 2.54
0.46*** 0.54***
Currency t 1.65
0.57***
Sovereign t -1 1.42
0.51***
Sovereign t 0.99
0.41**
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.17
Obs. 2159 2166 1997 2124 1409
Countries 53 53 53 53 53
Period 1966-2008 1966-2008 1966-2008 1966-2008 1970-2008
Notes: Estimation of the cross-crisis within-country contagion logit model using as a dependent variable the 
onsets of political crisis and as predictive variables the occurrences of different types of crisis the preceding or 
same year in the same country. All variables that do not appear in Table 6 have been ruled out of the model based 
on the forward step AIC selection method. Numbers in bold face indicate that the variable was selected by the 
more stringent BIC criterion. Both lagged and contemporaneous effects are allowed in the model. Standard errors 
are reported below the logit model coefficients. *** and ** indicate significance at the level of 1 and 5% 
respectively.
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A number of our results support the view that financial crises may diffuse to the 
political arena (Table 6). The most significant finding is the strong predictive power 
of sovereign and currency crises on onsets of revolutionary wars, an observation that 
fits well with the outburst of revolutionary war observed in Somalia in 1988, one year 
after a Paris club debt renegotiation.33 The probability of observing an onset of 
revolutionary war rises to about 3% (resp. 6%) when a sovereign default (resp. 
currency crisis) is observed the previous (resp. same) year, up from an unconditional 
probability of less than 1%. We also observe a significant but weaker predictive 
power of sovereign crises on onsets of armed conflicts.34
Figure 5: Links between different types of crisis
banking genocide
ethnic war
sovereign
armed conflict
currency
rev war
expro reg chg
Notes: Arrows point towards predicted onsets of crisis (from predicting crisis type). Thick line represents 
significance at level 1%, plain line at level 5%. Rev war stands for revolutionary war, reg chg for regime change 
and expro for expropriation. 
Overall, we find a low level of contagion from political to financial crises: Political 
crises predict crises of the same type, but, bar a few exceptions (from regime changes 
                                                            
33 Somalia suffered in the 1980s’ from a period of protracted monetary instability. A first devaluation 
occurred in 1982 (this episode corresponds to an onset of currency crisis according to our 
conventions). ‘Currency dips’ were then observed without interruption from 1984 to 1989. A Paris 
club sovereign debt renegotiation intervened in July 1987. The 1988 cities bombing marked the 
beginning of the Somali civil war (an uninterrupted sequence of genocides, ethnic wars, revolutionary 
wars or armed conflicts has torn Somalia from 1988 onwards). Intriguingly, the currency meltdown of 
1989 corresponds to the last full-fledged financial crisis recorded in our database.  
34 The probability of an onset of armed conflict conditional on a sovereign crisis the same year is 7.6%, 
up from an unconditional probability of 3.2%.
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to expropriations, mainly in the 70s’, and from armed conflicts to sovereign crises, 
only selected at 5% by the less stringent AIC model), do not significantly help in 
predicting crises of financial nature. Figure 5 presents the link between the different 
types of crises and shows the mutually predictive power of crises within blocks 
(across financial crises and across political crises). The Figure also illustrates the 
relatively low predictive power of political crises on financial crises.
6. Conclusion
Africa has been largely overlooked in the literature on financial crises. This paper 
helps fill this gap and provides several important contributions. First, compiling a 
unique crisis database covering 53 African countries since 1965 allowed us to assess
the intensity of financial crises in Africa. Second, we propose a new statistical 
framework to disentangle temporal and cross-crisis contagion effects. The model 
selection procedure used in this paper deals with the multicollinearity issues arising
from our framework and yields robust prediction models. Third, this paper confirms 
several features drawn from the financial crisis literature for Africa, namely the 
mutually predictive nature of banking and currency crises and the predictive power of 
banking crises on sovereign defaults. We add the insight that sovereign, banking and 
currency crises in fact all predict each other in the case of Africa. Finally, we revisit 
the link between political and financial crises, reaching two important conclusions.
On the one hand, we find evidence of contagions running from financial crises to 
political crises (e.g. currency and sovereign problems predict outbreaks of 
revolutionary wars). On the other hand, we show that political upheavals have a 
relatively modest predictive power on outbreaks of financial crises in Africa.
This result may seem at odds with previous literature at first glance. Our findings 
could be explained by some specificities of the African continent (less open and 
liquid capital markets, sentiment of ‘normalcy’ of political crises due to their high 
frequency etc.). The relatively low development of the African banking and financial 
sectors is a fair concern. The fact, however, that we retrieve the well-known spillover 
effects between currency, banking and sovereign crises suggests that the usual 
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financial contagion channels are at work. An alternative explanation relates to our 
event-based analysis of political and financial risks (contagions occurring between 
outbreaks of political and financial instability). What we document is that, although 
Africa is not spared by financial crises, these crises occur somewhat independently of 
the violent and sensationalized political upheavals that tear the continent apart.
An important implication of our results is that investors should refrain from 
overreacting to punctual political events when assessing the risk of a near-term 
sovereign default or banking and currency meltdowns. This message has a particular 
relevance in Africa given the high prevalence of political conflicts in the continent. 
The origins of the low level of contagion from political to financial crises should be 
further investigated, stimulating cross-disciplinary research at the frontier between the 
political conflicts and financial crises literature.
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Appendix. Databases presentation 
The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset provides annual information 
covering the period 1955 to the most current year, and it compiles information from 
multiple sources covering ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides and politicides, 
and adverse regime changes. Sequential events are treated as a single episode if less 
than five years have elapsed between the end of one event and the start of the next 
event. 
The following definitions are adapted from Marshall, Gurr, and Harff (2009).
Revolutionary wars are episodes of violent conflict between governments and 
politically organized groups that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace 
its leaders, or to seize power in one region. Conflicts must include substantial use of 
violence by one or both parties to qualify as “wars.” If the challenging group 
represents a national, ethnic, or other communal minority, the conflict is analyzed as 
an ethnic war, below. Political conflicts are considered revolutionary or ethnic wars if 
each party mobilizes 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops), and 
there must be at least 1000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of the 
armed conflict with at least 100 deaths for at least one year. 
Ethnic wars are episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, 
ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities in which the challengers seek major 
changes in their status. As with revolutionary wars, there are the two minimum 
thresholds for including an ethnic war event in the PITF state failure dataset: each 
party must mobilize 1000 or more people and there must be at least 1000 direct 
conflict-related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year 
when the annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities.
Adverse Regime Changes are defined as major, adverse shifts in patterns of 
governance, including major and abrupt shifts away from more open electoral 
systems to more closed authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites 
and the mode of governance; contested dissolution of federated states or secession of 
a substantial area of a state by extrajudicial means; and/or near-total collapse of 
central state authority and the ability to govern. Abrupt transitions from more 
authoritarian rule to more open, institutionalized governance systems are not 
included. The main criterion used to identify adverse regime changes is a drop of a 
minimum six points in the value of a state’s POLITY index score, a measure of the 
institutionalized regime authority characteristics of the central state, over a period of 
three years or less. Such changes may be accomplished by coup, fiat, or popular 
referendum. 
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Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied 
consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or in the case of 
civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the deaths of a 
substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group. In 
genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal 
(ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are 
defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant 
groups.
We also rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in order to capture political 
instability related to violent conflicts with other countries. Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) built a conflict-year dataset with information on armed conflict 
where at least one party is the government of a state in the time period 1946-2013. 
Armed conflict: As specific in Gleditsch et al. (2002), UCDP defines conflict as “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”
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Table A1. Crisis Episodes
Country Political Crisis (1965-2008) Currency Crisis (1965-2008) Expropriation (1965-2005)
Algeria 1991-2007 1991, 1994 1966-1968, 1970-1972, 1974, 
1976, 1978
Angola 1965-2002, 2004, 2007 1996, 1998-2001 1978
Benin 1965, 1972 1994 1969, 1974
Burkina Faso 1980, 1985, 1987 1994
Burundi 1965-1973, 1988-2006, 2008 1965, 1983
Cameroon 1984, 1996 1994 1977
Central African Republic 2001-2003, 2005-2008 1994 1969, 1974
Chad 1965-1994, 1997-2002, 2005-2008 1994 1971, 1975
Comoros 1976, 1989, 1995-1997, 1999 1994
Ivory Coast 2002-2008 1994 2003
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1965, 1967, 1977-1979, 1992-2008 1994-1996,1998-2000 1966, 1968-1970, 1974-1975, 
1997-1998
Congo, Rep of 1993-1994, 1997-1999, 2002 1994 1970, 1972, 1974-1976
Djibouti  1991-1994, 1999, 2008
Egypt 1967, 1969-1970, 1973, 1992-1999 1979, 1989-1991 1967, 1989, 1995
Equatorial Guinea 1969-1979 1971, 1974, 1994
Eritrea 1997-2000, 2003 1992, 2001
Ethiopia 1965-1993, 1996-2008 1992 1975, 1978
Gabon 1994 1973-1974
The Gambia 1981, 1994 1986 1973, 1979
Ghana 1966, 1972, 1981, 1983 1967, 1971, 1999-2000 1972-1976
Guinea  2000-2001 1986-1987 1972, 1977, 1979
Guinea-Bissau  1965-1973, 1998-1999, 2003 1983, 1987-1988, 1996
Kenya 1965-1966, 1969, 1982, 1991-1993 1993 1970-1971, 1975
Lesotho 1970, 1998-1999 1985, 2001 1992
Liberia 1980, 1985, 1989-1996, 2000-2003 1998 1972, 1977
Libya 1987 2002 1969-1974
Madagascar  1971 1973, 1987, 1994, 2004 1974-1978
Malawi 1994, 1998, 2000 1968-1969, 1971
Mali  1985, 1990-1995, 2007-2008 1994
Mauritania  1975-1978, 2008 1992 1974-1975
Morocco 1965, 1971, 1975-1989 1967, 1970-1971, 1974-1975, 
Mozambique 1965-1974, 1976-1992, 1987, 1991, 1993 1975-1979 
Namibia  1985, 2001 2004-2005
Niger  1992,1994,1996-1997, 2008 1994 1967, 1971, 1973-1974, 1976, 
1979
Nigeria 1965-1970, 1980-1985, 1996, 2004, 
2008
1986, 1989, 1992, 1999
Rwanda  1965-1966, 1990-2002 1966, 1990, 1994-1995
São Tomé and Príncipe 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997
Senegal 1990, 1992-2001, 2003 1994 1974
Seychelles 2008
Sierra Leone 1967, 1971, 1991-2002 1983, 1985-1987, 1989-1991, 
1997
1970
Somalia 1969, 1973, 1978, 1982-1984, 1986-
2008
1982, 1984-1989 1970
South Africa 1966-1996 1985, 2001
Sudan  1965-1972, 1976, 1983-2008 1992, 1994-1996 1970, 1976, 1978
Swaziland  1973 1985, 2001 1974
Tanzania 1978 1984, 1986, 1989 1967, 1971, 1973-1974, 1978
Togo 1986, 1991 1994 1972
Tunisia  1980
Uganda 1966-1969, 1971-2008 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987-1989 1970, 1972, 1975, 1977 
Zambia 1968-1972, 1996 1985-1986, 1989, 1992-1994, 
2008
1968-1973, 1975, 1980
Zimbabwe 1967-1968, 1972-1979, 1981-1987 1997-1998, 2000, 2003-2008 2004
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Table A2. Banking Crisis Episodes (1975-2008)
Country Systemic Banking Crisis All Banking Crisis 
Algeria 1990-1994 1990-1994
Angola 1991-1996
Benin 1988-1992 1988-1992
Botswana 1994-1995
Burkina Faso 1990-1994 1988–94
Burundi 1994-1998 1994-1998
Cameroon 1987-1991, 1995-1997 1987-1993, 1995-1998
Cape Verde 1993 1993
Central African Republic 1976, 1995-1996 1976-1982, 1988-1999
Chad 1983, 1992-1996 1980s, 1992-1996
Côte d'Ivoire 1988-1991
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1983, 1991-1992, 1994-1998 80s, 1991-1992, 1994-1998
Congo, Rep off 1992 – 1994 1992– 2002
Djibouti  1991-1995 1991-1995
Egypt 1980 80-81, 90-95
Equatorial Guinea 1983 83-85
Eritrea 1993 1993
Ethiopia 1994-1995
Gabon 1995
Gambia 1985-1992
Ghana 1982-1983 1982–89, 1997
Guinea  1985, 1993 1985, 1993-1994
Guinea-Bissau  1995-1998 1995-1998
Kenya 1985, 1992-1994 1985-1989, 1992-1996
Lesotho 1988
Liberia 1991-1995 1991-1995
Madagascar  1988 1988
Mali  1987-1991 1987-1991
Mauritania  1984 1984-1993
Mauritius 1996
Morocco 1980-84 1980-84
Mozambique 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1995
Niger  1983-1985 1983–96
Nigeria 1991-1995 1991–95, 1997
Rwanda  1991
São Tomé and Príncipe 1992 1980s, 1992-1994, 1997
Senegal 1988-1991 1988-1991
Sierra Leone 1990-1994 1990-1996
South Africa 1977-1978; 1989
Swaziland  1995-1999 1995-1999
Tanzania 1987-1988 1987-1997
Togo 1993-1994 1993-1995
Tunisia  1991 1991-1995
Uganda 1994 1994-1996
Zambia 1995-1998 1995-1998
Zimbabwe 1995-1999 1995-1999
Sources: Capri et al. (2005), Honohan and Leaven (2005), Leaven and Valencia (2010) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). We performed further research on IMFarticle IV, letter of intent and 
memorandum of understanding in order to refine the banking crisis dates.
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Table A3. Sovereign Crisis Episodes
Country Sovereign Crisis Sources
Algeria 1990-1991, 1993, 1995 Paris Club: 1990 and 1993; R&R (2008): 1991; IMF: 1995-1998.
Angola 1976, 1985, 1989 Paris Club: 1989; R&R (2008): 1985; S&P local currency bond: 1976.
Benin 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996 All Paris Club
Burkina Faso 1991, 1993, 1996 All Paris Club
Burundi 2004 Paris Club
Cameroon 1989, 1992, 1997, 2004 Paris Club except for 2004 which is a default in local currency bond (S&P 2006)
Central African Republic 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2007 All Paris Club; 1981 and 1983 are also in R&R (2008)
Chad 1989, 1995, 1996 All Paris Club
Ivory Coast 1983-1987, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000-2006
R&R (2008): 1983, 2000 is also in S&P as a default in foreign currency bond 
which lasted until 2006; The rest is Paris Club.
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1976-1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985-1987, 1989, 2002 All Paris Club
Congo, Rep of 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2004 All Paris Club
Djibouti  2000, 2008 All Paris Club
Egypt 1984, 1987, 1991 Paris Club: 1987 and 1991; R&R (2008): 1984. 
Equatorial Guinea 1985, 1989, 1992, 1994 All Paris Club
Ethiopia 1992, 1997, 2001 All Paris Club
Gabon 1987-1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999-2005
Paris Club: 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, 2000 and 2004; S&P local 
currency bond: 1999-2005; IMF: 1995-1999.
The Gambia 1986 Paris Club 
Ghana 1979, 1982, 1986, 2001 Paris Club: 1986, 2001; S&P, default on local currency bond: 1979, 1982.
Guinea  1986, 1989, 1992, 1995 All Paris Club
Guinea-Bissau  1987, 1989, 1995 All Paris Club
Kenya 1994, 2000, 2004 All Paris Club; 1994 and 2000 are also in R&R (2008)
Liberia 1980-1981, 1983-1984, 1989-2006, 2008
Paris Club: 1980,1981,1983,1984; S&P default on local currency bond: 1989-
2006; IMF: 2008-.
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Table A3. Sovereign Crisis Episodes (cont’d)
Country Sovereign Crisis Sources
Madagascar  1981-1982, 1984-1986, 1988, 1990, 1997, 2000, 2002 All Paris Club except for 2002 whuch is an S&P local currency bond
Malawi 1982-1983, 1988 All Paris Club
Mali  1988-1989, 1992, 1996 All Paris Club
Mauritania  1985-1987, 1989, 1993, 1995 All Paris Club
Morocco 1983, 1985-1988, 1990, 1992
Paris Club: 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1992; R&R (2008): 1983 and 
1986.
Mozambique 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998-1999 All Paris Club
Niger  1983-1986, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996 All Paris Club
Nigeria 1982, 1986-1989,  1991-1992, 2000-2001, 2004-2005
Paris Club: 1986, 1989, 1991, 2000 and 2005; R&R (2008): 1982, 1986, 1992, 
2001 and 2004; S&P default in foreign currency bond: 1986-1988,1992-2005.
Rwanda  1995, 1998 All Paris Club: 1998; S&P default in local currency bond: 1995. 
São Tomé and Príncipe 2000 Paris Club
Senegal 1981-1983, 1985-1987, 1989-1991, 1994, 1998 All Paris Club
Sierra Leone 1977, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997 All Paris Club except for 1997 which is an S&P local currency bond
Somalia 1985, 1987 All Paris Club
South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993 All R&R (2008)
Sudan  1979, 1982-1984, 1991 All Paris Club except for 1991 which is an S&P local currency bond
Tanzania 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1997 All Paris Club
Togo 1990, 1992, 1995 All Paris Club
Tunisia  1979, 1981, 1983-1985, 1988 Paris Club: 1979, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988 and 1989; IMF: 1988-1992.
Uganda 1981-1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998 All Paris Club
Zambia 1983-1984, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1999 All Paris Club; 1983 is also in R&R (2008)
Zimbabwe 1965, 1975-1980, 1992, 2000
R&R (2008): 1965, 2000; S&P as a default in foreign currency bond: 1975-
1980; IMF: 1992
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Table A4. Share of countries experiencing a crisis 
by types of crisis and number of occurrences—1965-2008
Variable
1 to 5 
crises 
6 to 10 
crisis 
11 to 15 
crisis 
16 to 20 
crisis 
more than 
20 crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expropriation 58% 9% 0% 0% 0%
Political Crisis 26% 19% 13% 8% 13%
Currency Crisis 77% 11% 0% 0% 0%
Banking Crisis 53% 19% 13% 2% 0%
Sovereign Crisis 49% 23% 6% 2% 2%
